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Updating the Maastricht Treaty may be a better option for
resolving the eurozone crisis than political union and closer
integration.
by Blog Admin
Wide ranging proposals for political union and closer co-operation between EU member states
have been put forward as a solution to the eurozone crisis. Heribert Dieter argues that this
preoccupation with centralised forms of decision-making on economic issues is misguided and
may bring with it several unanticipated problems. A better strategy would be to update the
current framework under the Maastricht Treaty, particularly by creating a concrete mechanism
through which states can leave the single currency.
The continuing f inancial crisis in some member countries of  the eurozone has intensif ied
the debate about ref orms of  monetary union. It is obvious that the original architecture of  the Treaty of
Maastricht has to be revised. The two alternatives suggested by the proponents of  deeper integration –
either deeper integration regarding monetary and f iscal policy, or a return to antagonistic, national policies
– are f ar f rom being inevitable. By contrast, it is possible to make monetary union more crisis-proof  while at
the same time giving the European nations a high degree of  responsibility f or their own economic
development. The f requently cited assertion that transf erring – i.e. centralizing – hitherto national
competencies to the European level would make f iscal policy and f inancial regulation easier to manage, is
not convincing. That approach ignores the downside of  centralization. Far-reaching centralization may
result in new problems and will weaken, not strengthen, the economic dynamism of  the EU.
For 30 months now the
eurozone has been agonizing
over a f inancial crisis that has
its origins in some of  the
member countries. But the
crisis has lingered on and there
has been no return to steady
growth. This situation has led
to urgent demands f or a quick
solution to end the crisis by
creating new, deeper f orms of
cooperation in the eurozone.
Proponents of  this line of
thinking argue that cooperation
in Europe can only succeed by
immediately creating a f iscal or banking union. However, alternatives do exist. An evolution of  the Treaty of
Maastricht is possible and would better serve the heterogeneity of  the EU than a centralization of
economic policies, which would inevitably result in a reduction of  sovereignty f or the European nation-
states.
In f act, the creation of  new supranational structures will probably not be conducive to solving the f iscal and
economic problems of  some European economies. In any case, it is unrealistic to expect a higher degree of
f inancial stability through centralization – f or instance, European supervision of  the f inancial sector.
Economic and f inancial history demonstrates this very clearly. Supporters of  centralized f inancial
supervision have to explain why the United States slipped into the f inancial crisis of  2008, which was the
worst since the 1930s. Established supranational regimes of  banking supervision have not prevented
serious crises. Even the banking supervision policy packages of  Basel I and Basel II have not prevented
numerous crises in the last three decades. Supranational rules f ailed in Mexico in 1994/95, during the Asian
crisis in 1997/98, as well as during the US subprime crisis of  2007/08 – to name just a f ew. Theref ore, it is
entirely appropriate to be sceptical about supposedly sweeping and promising solutions. Centralized
supervision is not immune to making the same mistakes as national authorit ies.
Cornerstones of Maastricht 2.0
The key question is whether there are any alternatives to deeper integration. It is clear, of  course, that
there are: Europe can evolve without a great leap f orward, which is rejected by a sizable number of  cit izens
in the eurozone, where support f or integration varies considerably between countries. One should not
f orget that the Maastricht Treaty of f ers several advantages, many of  which are worth preserving. The
common currency reduces transaction costs within the eurozone, without f orcing the participating
countries into a centrally planned f iscal policy straightjacket. This approach acknowledges the diversity of
European societies much better than a one-size-f its-all concept.
Europe can both strengthen the ownership of  economic and f iscal policies by individual societies as well as
provide incentives f or sustainable economic development. The key f actor is the elimination of  the
contradictions and inconsistencies of  the Maastricht Treaty. The three most important points are:
(1) There is a contradiction between the no-bailout clause (Article 125, Treaty on the Functioning of  the
European Union) and the absence of  an exit option. This regulatory gap has been successf ully exploited by
Greece. To prevent a recurrence, the Treaty of  Maastricht should be supplemented by an exclusion clause:
Member states that do not f ully service their payment obligations have to leave the monetary union within
six months af ter the def ault.
(2) States should be able to leave the eurozone, if  they consider the benef its of  membership to be lower
than the costs. A monetary union does not have to act as a custodian f or societies and impose certain and
everlasting monetary and exchange rate policies on them. Because of  the current compulsory membership,
monetary union also ceases to be attractive both to members and non-members.
(3) Individual countries should be permitted to protect themselves against unwanted capital inf lows. The
prevailing doctrine – only unrestricted capital f lows ensure rising prosperity – has to be called into question
af ter recent experiences. Temporary restrictions on capital inf lows may enable individual economies to curb
excesses in the markets and to shield an economy f rom their negative ef f ects. Today, countries are not
allowed to limit capital f lows within the European Union. Article 63 of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the
European Union prohibits any restrictions.
Europe 2020 – A centrally planned economy or return to national ownership?
In the f inancial crisis, Europe has been stumbling toward an economic system that is reminiscent of  a
planned economy. A weakly legit imized institution – the European Central Bank (ECB) – is being endowed
with f ar-reaching and previously inconceivable powers. In addition, the ECB declares certain market-
determined interest rates as too high – a classical case of  administrative hubris. The creeping
disempowerment of  national governments and parliaments by the ECB is alarming f rom a (German)
constitutional perspective, and it should lead to the f urther strengthening of  Euro-crit ical assessments.
The author Hans Magnus Enzensberger has described this process as the disenf ranchisement of  the
European cit izen and has consistently warned about this risk. But there are alternatives f or European
integration. A revised treaty – Maastricht 2.0 – should aim at minimizing the transf ers of  sovereignty to the
supranational level, insist on the compliance of  contracts, and strengthen national ownership of  economic
policies in the member countries of  the European Union.
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